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Between Physician and Patient1
Clinton DeWitt
IN ANCIENT -times, wholesale exclusion of classes of persons from
the opportunity of testifying was the rule. A person might be disquali-
fied to be a witness because of race, color, sex, infancy, condition of
servitude, religion, relationship, interest in the outcome of the litigation,
mental illness, or conviction of crime.2 In later years, as the common
law developed, much, though not all, of the policy of exclusion was in-
corporated into the expanding rules of evidence. The courts considered
this necessary in order to
bar persons believed to be
THE AuTHOR (A.B., 1910, Western Reserve, biased, unstable, or untrust-
LL.B., 1912, Western Reserve, LL.D., 1954, worthy from appearing as
Temple) is Professor of Law Emeritus, Western
Reserve University. witnesses -in a court of jus-
tice. At the beginning of
the nineteenth century,
most of the rules of exclusion were well established, but with a resulting
loss of a vast amount of relevant evidence which might have aided the
court, or the jury, in the final determination of the factual matters in
dispute; moreover, the policy of exclusion had progressed so far that it
had almost reached the realm of absurdity. With the passage of time,
however, most of the grounds of absolute incompetency were swept away,
the courts laying more emphasis upon the credibility of the witness; less
upon his competency.
In England, for nearly four hundred years, compulsion of witnesses
to appear and to testify has been the rule. Prior to that time, a person,
if he could qualify as a witness, might testify or not as he chose; he
could not be compelled to do so. In 1562, by Act of Eliz. c. 9, § 12,
provision was made for the service of process out of any court of record
requiring the person served to appear and to testify concerning any
1. The material herein has been extracted from sections 1, 8, 9 and 11 of Professor
DeWitt's latest book, PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONs BETWEEN PHYsICIAN AND
PATIENT, published in 1958 by Charles C. Thomas who has graciously consented
to the publication of this material. The Editors would also like to indicate that space
limitations necessitated the deletion of many of the exhaustive footnotes found in
the original text.
2. Barnhart, Theory of Testimonial Competency and Privilege, 4 ARK. L. REv. 377
(1950); Rowley, The Competency of Witnesses, 24 IOWA L. REV. 482 (1939).
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cause or matter pending in the court, under penalty of ten pounds be-
sides damages to be recovered by the aggrieved. This was based on the
fundamental principle of government that the administration of justice is
a mutual benefit to all members of a community, and every competent
citizen is under an obligation to further it as a matter of public duty;
that the personal sacrifice is a part of the necessary contribution to the
welfare of the public3
Shortly after the policy of testimonial compulsion became established
in England, the courts occasionally were confronted by witnesses who re-
fused to answer particular questions put to them on the ground that their
testimony would necessarily result in the disclosure of confidential com-
munications or information which, for reasons of public policy or personal
honor, they ought not to be compelled to reveal. Usually it was claimed
by such witnesses that matters of a genuinely confidential character were
not the proper subject of inquiry in courts of law; that, to improve the
administration of justice, all persons should be encouraged to come for-
ward with their evidence by shielding them as far as possible from com-
pulsory disclosure of matters strictly confidential. On the other hand,
it was urged that the courts were duty bound to see that complete justice
was done; that to achieve this objective, no barrier should be erected
against the discovery of the truth; that, therefore, no witnesses should
have the right to withhold relevant evidence and thus suppress or conceal
the truth, or any portion thereof, no matter how harmful to himself or
to others its effect might be,4 provided it did not tend to convict him of
a crime, or subject him to a penalty.
Ultimately, however, the courts became persuaded that the duty of
testifying, so onerous at times yet so necessary to the administration of
justice, should properly be subject to mitigation in exceptional circum-
stances. Accordingly, throughout the course of its history, the common
law, both in British and American jurisdictions, has conferred ever-increas-
ing privileges of non-disclosure in favor of particular persons who have
been lawfully summoned to attend and to give evidence in the courts of
justice,5 privileges which enable them to decline to answer questions
which elicit the disclosure of confidential communications and informa-
3. Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 281 (1918); 1v re Herrnstein, 20 Ohio
Op. 405, 412 (1941); Ealy v. Shetler Ice Cream Co., 108 W. Va. 184, 150 S.E.
539 (1929).
4. Learned Hand, J., in McMann v. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n 87 F.2d 377, 378
(1937), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 684: "... . the duty to disclose in a court all informa-
tion within one's control, testimonially or by the production of documents, is usually
paramount over any private interest that may be affected."
5. As to the basis of privileges, see 8 WiGMo, , EVIDENCE §5 2192, 2197, 2285
(3d ed. 1940).
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tion inimical to the interest of the witness,6 or of the state, or of society
in general. Broadly speaking, the matters affected by the doctrine of
privilege may be classified as political, judicial, social, and professional.
The more widely-known of these privileges are those which relate to state
secrets, political votes, trade secrets, religious beliefs, anti-marital facts,
and self-incriminating matters; those which -have been extended to per-
sons standing in a confidential relationship such as husband and wife,
grand jurors, petit jurors, judges, arbitrators, public officers, and informers
who furnish government officials evidence of crime; and that which is
granted to attorneys acting in a professional capacity.
In justification of these privileges, it has been said that all of these
matters lie in the policy of the state which considers that the injury to
such relationships which would result from enforced disclosure of confi-
dential information acquired therein, would be greater than the loss to
justice occasioned by granting the privilege.7
MEDICAL ETHICS AND THE LAW: THE DuTY OF SECRECY
Everywhere medical confidences are regarded as sacred and precious.
Unquestionably one of the highest duties of the physician is to keep
secret and inviolate the intimate knowledge of his patient's disease, ail-
ment, or physical -imperfection, especially that which he learned by means
of communication, observation, or examination in the course of his pro-
fessional employment. Hippocrates (circa 400 B.C.), renowned as the
"Father of Medicine," was perhaps the first to express the ethical duty
of the physician. His Oath, a self-imposed criterion of professional con-
duct, has come down through the ages. Pledging himself that never
would he voluntarily divulge the medical confidences of his patients,
Hippocrates vowed, among other things:
Whatsoever things I see or hear concerning the life of men, in my
attendance on the sick or even apart therefrom which ought not to be
6. It does not necessarily follow, however, that because a communication is made
in confidence or upon a promise of secrecy, it comes under the protection of priv-
ilege. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2286 (3d ed. 1940); 5 JONES, COMMENTARIES
ON EVIDENcE § 2219 (2d ed. 1926). See McMann v. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, 87
F.2d 377 (1937); In re Frye, 155 Ohio St. 345, 98 N.E.2d 798 (1951).
7. This view, however, has not been universally approved; in fact, there has been
at times, strong opposition to the whole policy of testimonial privilege. See Purring-
ton, An Abused Privilege, 6 COLUM. L REv. 388 (1906). And also see, Whipple,
The Legal Privilege of Concealing the Truth, 10 MASS. L. Q. 31 (1925).
There is eminent authority for the view that the traditional justifications for var-
ious testimonial privileges are inept and fallacious. Morgan, Foreword, MODEL
CODE OF EVIDENCE 22-30 (1942). McCormick, The Scope of Privilege in the Law
of Evidence, 16 TExAs L. REv. 447 (1938).
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noised abroad, I will keep silence thereon, counting such things to be as
sacred secrets.8
Protected by no greater guaranty of secrecy than this, countless gen-
erations of men and women, freely and confidently, have entrusted their
most intimate and delicate secrets to their medical advisers.
It must be remembered, however, that we are not dealing with a ques-
tion of medical ethics or professional etiquette pertaining to the conduct
of the physician outside the courtroom; on the contrary, we are concerned
only with a testimonial privilege, created by legislative enactment, which
prohibits a disclosure by the physician, when called to testify in a lawful
proceeding, of confidential communications made to, or information ac-
quired by, him in the course of his professional attendance upon the
patient. It is manifest, of course, that a voluntary disclosure by the
physician of medical confidences gained while attending the patient -
when not made in the course of his professional duty - is a plain viola-
tion of medical ethics and professional propriety, but the physician-
patient privilege statute does not prescribe a rule of conduct for the
government of physicians in their general intercourse with society.
Therefore, -if the physician, disregarding the ethical duty of secrecy,
should, -in conversation or otherwise, reveal the intimate confidences of
the patient, he would not violate the statute however reprehensible his
conduct would be As far as the statute goes, the physician may talk
about the ailments of the patient from New York to San Francisco and
to every Tom, Dick and Harry on the street or in his club, since the
statute merely permits the patient, or the holder of the privilege, to seal
the lips of the physician against testifying in a judicial proceeding,1" or
8. See Foxe, The Oath of Hippocrates, 19 PSYCHIATRIC Q. 17 (1945); Brandeis,
The Physician and Medical Ethics, 38 MED. REV. OF REv. 699 (1932); Flannagan,
The Spirit of the Oath, 57 VA. MED. Mo. 538 (1930).
For scope and effect of the oath, see Morrison v. Malmquist, 62 So.2d 415
(Fla. 1953).
9. Nelson v. Nederland Life Ins. Co., 110 Iowa 600, 81 N.W. 807 (1900); Sim-
onsen v. Swenson, 104 Neb. 224, 177 N.W. 831 (1920); Buffalo Loan, Trust and
Safe Dep. Co. v. Knights Templar and M. A. Ass'n, 126 N.Y. 450, 27 N.E. 942
(1891); Boyle v. Northwestern Mut. Relief Ass'n, 95 Wis. 312, 70 N.W. 351
(1897).
See DeWitt, Medical Ethics and the Law: The Conflict Between Dual Allegiances,
5 WEST. REs. L. REv. 5 (1953); Chafee, Is Justice Served or Obstructed by Closing
the Doctor's Mouth on the Witness Stand? 52 YALE L. J. 607 (1943); Purrington,
An Abused Privilege, 6 COLUM. L. REv. 388 (1906). There is no punishment pro-
vided for the physician who reveals what has been confided to him. Jacobs v. Cedar
Rapids, 181 Iowa 407, 164 N.W. 891 (1917).
10. Noble v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 230 Iowa 471, 297 N.W. 881 (1941).
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an investigation authorized by law," and is wholly ineffectual to prevent
a public disclosure elsewhere."
REASONS FOR THE STATUTE
There has been and is a considerable difference of opinion regarding
the purpose and policy of the statute. Various reasons for its enactment
have been offered. It will be remembered that the common law afforded
no protection whatever for the confidences reposed by sick and injured
persons in their physicians. No matter what the confidence or secret was,
however intimate or delicate, he who held it was compellable to disclose
'it in the interests of justice. Yet many persons, especially those of the
medical profession, firmly believed that the fact that the physician was
-bound to reveal to the world in open court, whenever so directed 'by the
judge, every bit of information he had acquired during his professional
employment, could not but act as a deterrent so as to cause patients to
suffer untold anguish and torment, rather than divulge facts inexorably
held secret. That dread, whether the fear of exposure and disgrace, or
the recoil from the infliction of humiliation or grief on others, was the
real mischief, it was said, which the common law did not prevent or
abate.'- It is highly probable, therefore, that it was precisely this pre-
sumptive "mischief" that the authors of the early statutes sought to put
an end to.
Generally speaking, 'however, the courts have not been content to base
the origin of the statutory privilege upon this ground alone. On the
contrary, other purposes and objectives have been attributed to it. Some
courts have held that one of its principal objectives is a humane one,
since it gives the patient "free conduct and free tongue" with his medical
adviser to the end that the latter 'may have the information necessary to
enable him to render as much aid as possible for the restoration of the
patient's health and for relief from his pain and discomfort.' 4 Others
have said that its primary purpose is to protect the patient's right to
11. New York City Council v. Goldwater, 284 N.Y. 296, 31 N.E.2d 31, (1940).
12. American Republic Life Ins. Co. v. Edenfield, 306 S.W.2d 321 (Ark. 1957);
Maryland Cas. Co. v. Maloney, 119 Ark 434, 178 S.W. 387 (1915); Noble v. United
Benefit Life Ins. Co., 230 Iowa 471, 297 N.W. 881 (1941); Jacobs v. Cedar Rapids,
181 Iowa 407, 164 N.W. 891 (1917); People v. Shurley, 131 Mich. 177, 91 N.W.
139 (1902); Cramer v. Hurt, 154 Mo. 112, 55 S.W. 258 (1900).
13. Barton, J., in National Mut. Life Ass'n v. Godrich, 10 Comm. L. R. (Aus-
tralia) 1, 19 (1909).
14. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Bergeron, 25 F.2d 680 (1928), cert. denied 278 U.S.
638; Hartley v. Calbreath, 127 Mo. App. 559, 106 S.W. 570 (1907); Arnold v.
Maryville, 110 Mo. App. 254, 85 S.W. 107 (1905); Green v. Metropolitan Street
Ry., 171 N.Y. 201, 63 N.E. 958 (1902).
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privacy.' 5 Several courts have expressed the novel view that the real
purpose of the statute -is to protect the patient from his own physician;
that frequently the patient and his physician do not stand on equal terms
and, therefore, the patient may easily 'be imposed upon by his own phy-
sician and induced to make admissions detrimental to his own interests. 6
The Supreme Court of Ohio, in adopting this view, went on to say that
this defensive feature of the statute is an important one.' 7 Another ex-
planation given for the existence of the statute is that the employee-
patient may be under the care of a "company doctor" and -because of the
relationship -between employer and physician, the physician, consciously
or unconsciously, is inclined to give testimony -more favorable to the
company which employs him than to the employee-patient whom he has
treated.' 8 It has also been said that the purpose of the statute is to place
the information obtained by the physician from his patient substantially
upon the same footing with the information acquired by an attorney
while acting professionally in his clienes affair.'9
The great majority of the courts, however, declare that the primary
purpose of the statute, manifest above all others, is to evoke and en-
courage the utmost confidence between the patient and his physician and
to preserve it inviolate,20 so that the patient will freely and frankly re-
veal to his physician all of the facts, circumstances, and symptoms of his
malady or injury, or lay bare his body for examination, and thus enable
his physician to make a correct diagnosis of his condition and treat him
more safely and efficaciously.2 1 It seems to 'be taken for granted that the
15. Studabaker v. Faylor, 52 Ind. App. 171, 98 N.E. 318 (1912); Chaffee v.
Kaufman, 113 Kan. 254, 214 Pac. 618 (1923); Culver v. Union Pac. R.R., 112 Neb.
441, 199 N.W. 794 (1924); Davis v. Supreme Lodge, K. of H., 165 N.Y. 159, 58
N.E. 891 (1900); Williams v. State, 65 Okla. Crim. 336, 86 P.2d 1015 (1939).
If this view be sound, one may well ask why the lawmakers have not enacted a
statute which will protect his right to privacy outside the courtroom.
16. Mr. Justice Pitney put forth this view in Arizona & New Mexico Ry. v. Clark,
235 U.S. 669 (1915).
It is submitted with respect, that this animadversion upon the medical profession
is undeserved and grossly unfair. Moreover, it seems well-nigh unbelievable that
any legislature would indulge such a low opinion of the medical profession and found
upon it a repressive statute.
17. Baker v. Industrial Comm'n, 135 Ohio St. 491, 21 N.E.2d 593 (1939).
18. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Hood, 124 Miss. 548, 87 So. 115 (1920).
See also dissent in Booren v. McWilliams, 26 N.D. 558, 588, 145 N.W. 410,
418 (1914).
19. Pierson v. People, 79 N.Y. 424, 433 (1880); Edington v. Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
5 Hun. (N.Y.) 1, 8 (1875).
20. The statutes of California, Colorado, Guam, Idaho, Montana, Oregon and Utah
expressly declare this to be the policy of the privilege.
21. Miller, J., in Edington v. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 67 N.Y. 185, 194 (1876): "To
open the door to the disclosure of secrets revealed on the sick bed, or when consult-
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legislatures which enacted the statute firmly believed that this desirable
objective could best be attained by prohibiting physicians to reveal in
courts of law the medical confidences imparted to them, especially those
pertaining to diseases or physical imperfections which might expose the
patient to civil or criminal prosecution, or subject him to humiliation,
embarrassment, disgrace, reproach or unfriendly comment.22
CRITICISM OF THE PRIVILEGE
The main purpose of a judicial inquiry is to ascertain by rational
means where the truth lies upon the issue of fact involved; and the policy
of the law is to require the disclosure of all information by witnesses in
order -that justice may prevail. The primary object of all the laws of
evidence, therefore, should be to bring the whole truth of a case before the
court and jury. No thoughtful person will deny that the exclusion of
relevant and -important evidence - oftentimes the best evidence - pre-
sents a serious obstacle to the administration of justice. For how other-
wise can justice be done unless the judgment rests upon truth, and truth
alone? It seems strange, therefore, that a system of law designed to ascer-
tain the truth, should embody rules which permit a litigant to withhold
or shut out, at 'his option, material portions of it. Hence, a statute which
prevents a physician, when lawfully summoned as a witness, from testi-
fying to facts within his personal knowledge and relevant and material
to the issue on trial, can only be justified by clear and convincing proof,
based on reason and experience - not on sentiment or surmise - that
the claimed advantage and benefits which may result to the general public
from the shielding of confidences arising from the physician-patient re-
lationship, far outweigh the 'harm and injustice which necessarily results
to litigants from the concealment or suppression of the truth in actions
-in which the public has little or no concern.23
ing a physician, would destroy confidence between the physician and the patient, and,
it is very easy to see, might tend very much to prevent the advantages and benefits
which flow from this confidential relationship."
22. City and County of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 37 Cal.2d 227, 232, 231
P.2d 26, 28 (1951): "The whole purpose of the privilege is to preclude the hu-
miliation of the patient that might follow the disclosures of his ailments." Pierson
v. People, 79 N.Y. 424, 434 (1880) : "The plain purpose of this statute .. . was
to enable a patient to make known his condition to his physician without the danger
of any disclosure by him which would annoy the feelings, damage the character, or
impair the standing of the patient while living, or disgrace his memory when dead.
It could have no other purpose."
For an exhaustive list of representative cases explaining the purpose and policy
of the privilege see DEWirr, PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN PHYSICIAN
AND PATIENT, § 9 n. 11 (1958).
23. Chafee, Is Justice Served or Obstructed by Closing the Doctor's Mouth on the
Witness Stand? 52 YALE L. J. 607, 609 (1943): "Secrecy in court is prima facie
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Throughout its history, the physician-patient privilege has been the
subject of considerable discussion and, admittedly, much has been said
in its favor. Unquestionably, the legislatures which adopted the privilege
deemed -it a wise one24 and, as we have seen, many courts have justified
its existence on the ground of public policy. But the public policy of
one generation may not, under different conditions, be the public policy
of another. 'Things change, and times change, and men change." Ex-
perience, the most dependable of all teachers, has demonstrated that the
hopes of the authors of the original statute were illusive. No thoughtful
judge or trial lawyer will deny that the privilege, in our day, is much
abused. The law reports, federal and state, and the accumulated experi-
ence of judges and lawyers in the trial courts furnish ample evidence of
this fact.25 It is not surprising, therefore, that, in recent years, the voices
of disapproval -have become predominant. Judges, lawyers, textwriters,
and teachers have severely criticized the privilege as having but little, if
any, justification -for its existence,28 and of effecting great injury to
the cause of justice by the concealment and suppression of useful truth,27
calamitous, and it is permissible only when we are very sure that frankness will do
more harm than good. With doctors' secrets as with any other kind of secrets, the
only proper test is the welfare of the community. Courtroom secrecy in the particu-
lar case must produce a public good which more than offsets the risks resulting from
the concealment of truth and from the lies which can be made with less fear of
detection."
See also 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2285 (3d ed. 1940).
24. The fact, however, that England, Scotland, and most of the other jurisdictions
of the British Commonwealth of Nations, as well as seventeen American jurisdic-
tions, have never adopted the privilege, dearly indicates that its wisdom has not been
universally apparent.
25. Lamm, J., in Epstein v. Pennsylvania R.R., 250 Mo. 1, 40, 156 S.W. 699, 711
(1913) : "The scandals in beating down the truth arising from a too harsh and literal
interpretation of this law.., every one of us knows by experience and observation
in the courtroom."
See also Randa v. Bear, 312 P.2d 640 (1957).
26. Freedman, Medical Privilege, 32 CAN. B. REV. 1, 4 (1954); Duque, Privileged
Communications Between Physician and Patient, 360 INs. L. J. 19 (1953); Peterson,
The Patient-Physician Privilege in Missouri, 20 KAN. L. REV. 122, 136 (1952);
Barnhart, Theory of Testimonial Competency and Privilege, 4 ARK. L. REV. 377,
406 (1950); Lipscomb, Privileged Communications Statute - Sword and Shield, 16
MIss. L J. 181 (1944); Morgan, Suggested Remedy of Obstructions to Expert Testi-
mony by Rules of Evidence, 10 U. CH. L. REv. 285, 290 (1943); Welch, Another
Anomay-The Patient's Privilege, 13 Mss. L J. 137 (1941); Curd, Privileged
Communications Between the Doctor and his Patient, 44 W. VA. L. Q. 165 (1938);
81 U. PA. L REV. 755 (1933); Purrington, An Abused Privilege, 6 COLUM. L.
REv. 388 (1906); Purrington, A Recent Case of Patient's "Privilege," 9 BENCH AND
BAR 48 (1907); Bach, The Medico-Legal Aspect of Privileged Communications, 10
MEICO-LEG. J. 33 (1892).
See also 8 WiGMORE, EvDENCE § 2380a (3d ed. 1940). This is the best yet
most severe of all criticisms.
27. GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE § 2 4 7a (16th ed. 1899): "In all these cases, the medi-
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the disclosure of which ordinarily could harm no one.28 In denouncing
the privilege, some of these have characterized it as a "farce," "parody
on justice," "misguided sentimentality," "sop," "instrument of injustice,"
"perversion of justice," "monumental hoax" and an "obstruction to the
administration of justice." Wigmore has described it as "merely a clever
legerdemain, loaned by the Law to the parties to suppress the truth,' 29
and two judges have regarded it as one which may oftentimes "cheat"
rather than promote justice3 °
It has -been estimated that ninety percent of the litigation in which
the privilege is invoked consists of three classes of cases: (a) actions on
policies of life, accident or health insurance; (b) actions for damages for
personal injury or for wrongful death; (c) testamentary actions where the
mental competency of the testator is the principal issue. In nearly all of
the cases, the testimony of the physician who attended the patient is
generally the best and most reliable evidence. Nevertheless and notwith-
standing, the patient, or the holder of the privilege may, at his option,
close the door of all courts to the receipt of the physician's testimony no
matter how much light it may throw upon the controversy, no matter
how much logical connection it may have with the issue of fact to be
proved or disproved. 3 ' In other words, as one court frankly stated,
3 2
the statute permits the holder of the privilege to use the testimony of the
physician if he thinks the evidence will bolster his case, or exclude it if
offered by his adversary, when he thinks it will weaken it. The question
of dealing justly between the patient, or the holder of the privilege, and
third parties is a secondary considerarion.33
cal testimony is 'the most vital and reliable,' 'the most important and decisive,' and
is absolutely needed for the purpose of learning the truth."
28. Boyles v. Cora, 232 Iowa 822, 848, 6 N.W.2d 401, 414 (1942).
29. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2389 (3d ed. 1940).
30. Start, C.J., in Olson v. The Court of Honor, 100 Minn. 117, 123, 110 N.W.
374, 377 (1907); Owen, J., in Maine v. Maryland Cas. Co., 172 Wis. 350, 359, 178
N.W. 749, 752 (1920).
31. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Bergeron, 25 F.2d 680, 683 (1928), cert. denied, 278
U.S. 638: "In many cases it will close the door to the best possible evidence on the
issue of fact presented for determination." Renihan v. Dennin, 103 N.Y. 573, 9
N.E. 320 (1886); Paxos v. Jarka Co., 314 Pa. 148, 171 Ad. 468 (1934).
It is interesting and very welcome to note that the legislatures of some states
have amended their statutes so as to withdraw the privilege from operation in one
or more of these classes of cases.
32. Record v. Saratoga Springs, 46 Hun. (N.Y.) 448 (1887), af 'd, 120 N.Y.
646, 24 N.E. 1102 (1890).
33. Arizona & New Mexico Ry. v. Clark, 235 U.S. 669 (1915); American Bank-
ers' Ins. Co. v. Hopkins, 67 Okla. 150, 169 Pac. 489 (1917).
Some courts have lamented the fact that the privilege gives aid and comfort to
unscrupulous litigants in many cases with the result that innocent persons are mulcted
of large sums of money; nevertheless "with face unmoved" and aware of the wrongs
[September
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The principal reasons advanced in support of the privilege are not
convincing. The traditional theory that a person suffering from a serious
disease or painful injury will hesitate to confide in a physician unless he
has complete assurance that his confidences cannot later be revealed by
the physician3 4 in some future litigation, has been thoroughly discredited
and disproved. The basic fallacy of the theory is that one must assume
that the prospective patient knows all about the privilege and, specifically,
the protection it affords. Of course, such an assumption is utterly un-
warranted. There is not one patient in many thousands who knows any-
thing about the privilege or has ever heard of it. It need not be remarked
that unless the patient has some knowledge of the protection afforded
by the privilege before he consults the physician, there can be no reliance
upon it; therefore, it can have no effect whatever upon the patient's state
of mind and can offer no inducement to him to freely and frankly reveal
confidential information which he would not otherwise disclose.3 5 Fur-
thermore, only a relatively small number of patients would shy at con-
sulting a physician even though they knew that he might later be required
to disclose their state of health or the nature and effect of their injuries
in a court of law. It need hardly be mentioned that as compared with
the numerous ailments which affect the human body, those which bring
shame and disgrace to the sufferer are inconsiderable. Ordinarily, bodily
injuries and disease are attended with neither humiliation nor disgrace
and most of them are not kept secret even by the patients themselves,
many of whom, -if given the chance, being ready and willing to relate to
their friends and relatives the details of their maladies, injuries, or surgical
operations. In all the range of human ailments there is, perhaps, but
one that the sufferer would be prone to conceal, and that is venereal dis-
ease. But even in the matter of this -loathsome disease, the physician, in
practically every state, is required by law to report such cases to the
being perpetrated, they have enforced the statute to the point of rank absurdity.
See Meyer v. Supreme Lodge, K. of P., 178 N.Y. 63, 70 N.E. 111 (1904), a!f'd,
198 U.S. 508 (1905).
34. The incongruity of the privilege is patent. If it be true that it is designed to
encourage persons to consult freely their medical advisers, why, then, is it not ex-
tended to psychiatrists, nurses, Christian Science practitioners, and professional men
engaged in specialized fields of medical science? Surely the secrets imparted to such
persons engaged in the art of healing are often as intimate and sacred as those ac-
quired by physicians engaged in the general practice of medicine.
35. Some courts have disapproved this view. People v. Stout, 3 Park. Cr. (N.Y.)
670, 679 (1858) : "It is no valid objection to an application of this statute, that the
prisoner [the alleged patient] did not probably know of its existence, and had no
opinion whether or not the particulars of that interview would be privileged from
disclosure. It is a sufficient answer that the salutary rule of law stands upon the
statute book, and is to be dispensed alike to those familiar with or ignorant of its
existence and applicability."
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public health authorities where it may -become a matter of public record.
Nevertheless, experience has shown that even this fearsome but required
publicity will not discourage patients from making a full disclosure of
their symptoms and distress to their physicians.
Another and, perhaps, the most favored theory is that the injury to
the relationship of physician and patient is greater than the injury to the
cause of justice; that in the interests of the public health,36 public policy
demands that medical confidences be protected against disclosure. There
is not a whit of evidence that the privilege tends to improve the public
health.3 7  On the other hand, there is abundant evidence that it under-
mines the very foundations of justice. The conjectural social policy be-
hind such privilege is completely overborne by the injustices which too
often result from the suppression of relevant and important evidence 38 It
need hardly be observed that the citizens of seventeen states in America
and countless persons in the British Commonwealth of Nations freely
consult their physicians with no assurance whatever that, should their
state of health or their injuries become the subject of litigation, their con-
fidences cannot be revealed by their physicians when relevant to the
issues on trial; yet the level of public health in these jurisdictions has not,
for lack of a physician-patient privilege, been lowered beyond that of
other jurisdictions which have adopted it.39 Furthermore, no one would
contend that the progress of medical science in the great hospitals and
medical schools in Baltimore, Boston, and Chicago, for example, has been
retarded because their patients do not have the protection of the privi-
lege. Patients attend these renowned institutions not to bring damage
suits but to seek medical advice and treatment, and the lack of a phy-
sician-patient privilege does not deter a single one of them from disclos-
ing to the physicians and surgeons their most intimate confidences or sub-
mitting their naked bodies for examination.
In the vast majority of the reported cases where the privilege has been
claimed, the patient or the party objecting to the testimony of the attending
physician, did not invoke the privilege in order to protect the patient's
right to privacy or to prevent the disclosure of matters which would
36. Snyker v. Snyker, 245 Minn. 405, 407, 72 N.W.2d 357, 359 (1955); "This
statutory shield is solely for the protection of the patient and is designed to promote
health and not truth." See McCoRMicK, EVIDENCE § 105 (1954).
37. Morgan, Comments on the Proposed Code of Evidence, 20 CAN. B. REv. 271,
279 (1942); Ladd, A Modern Code of Evidence, 27 IowA L. REv. 213, 224-225
(1942); Morgan, Some Observations Concerning a Model Code of Evidence, 89 U.
PA. L. REv. 145, 151 (1940).
38. Larson, C.J., in Clawson v. Walgreen Drug Co., 108 Utah 577, 602, 162 P.2d
759, 771 (1945).
39. Morgan, Suggested Remedy of Obstructions to Expert Testimony By Rules of
Evidence, 10 U. CH. L. REv. 285, 291 (1943).
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humiliate or disgrace the patient;40 rather his primary motive was to use
the privilege as a procedural device for the single purpose of winning
a lawsuit 'by excluding relevant and material evidence which, were it
admitted, would tend to reduce, if not defeat, his chances for a verdict
in his favor.41 The accumulated experience of many decades shows that
the privilege has accomplished little but the concealment and suppression
of the truth. When a party voluntarily puts in issue his state of health
or his bodily injury and discloses the details thereof to serve his own
pecuniary ends, any good and sufficient reason for maintaining the si-
lence of the physician no longer obtains. A patient may keep the door
of the sick-room closed, but he should not be permitted to open it so as
to give an imperfect or false view of what took place there, and promptly
shut the door the moment the true facts are about to be revealed. It is
a monstrous thing to permit a party to fabricate evidence for himself
in this class of cases, and then deny his adversary the right to resort to the
only reliable means to elict the truth. Nevertheless, the law reports are
filled with cases where such miscarriages of justice have occurred.4 2
In the few instances where an honest patient does dread disclosure
of his state of health 'by the physician, his real and most distressing fear is
not that the physician may some day be compelled to disclose the truth
in a court of law, but that he will voluntarily reveal the facts to some
friend or relative on the street or in his club, or that the physician may
make his affliction the subject of an article in some medical journal or of
an address 'before a group of medical men. Yet the physician-patient
privilege affords him no protection against this possible danger.43
40. Fowler, J., in Prudential Ins. Co. v. Kozlowski, 226 Wis. 641, 644, 276 N.W.
300, 302 (1938).
41. Purrington, A Recent Case of Patient's Privilege, 9 BENCH AM BAR 48, 52
(1907): "What is there indelicate or of a nature to humiliate a patient claiming
damages for defective vision or a broken leg, or any other injury displayed in evi-
dence, in proving that the condition attributed to a recent accident was of long stand-
ing? Such a disclosure might show that the litigation was dishonest; but the phy-
sician's testimony... would not be in itself humiliating or disgraceful, or reveal
any secret except that the injury exhibited as new was in fact old."
42. Some judges and text writers have unsparingly denounced the abuse of the
privilege. Dahlquist v. Denver & Rio G.R.R., 52 Utah 438, 454, 174 Pac. 833, 839
(1918); 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2389 (3d ed. 1940): "The privilege under
those circumstances becomes a burlesque upon logic and justice." See Nelson v.
Ackerman, 83 N.W.2d 500, 506 (Minn. 1957).
43. That this danger is not fanciful can be proved by several reported cases where
physicians and hospitals made extra-judicial disclosures, or exhibitions of their pa-
tients' ailments or physical imperfections under circumstances constituting an un-
warranted invasion of their rights to privacy. See Bazemore v. Savannah Hospital,
171 Ga. 257, 155 S.E. 194 (1930); DeMay v. Roberts, 46 Mich. 160, 9 N.W. 146(1881); Sullings v. Shakespeare, 46 Mich. 408, 9 N.W. 451 (1881); Feeney v.
Young, 191 App. Div. 501, 181 N.Y. Supp. 481 (1920); Griffin v. Medical So-
ciety, 11 N.Y.S.2d 109 (1939).
1959]
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
But there are hopeful signs of better things to come. The mounting
waves of protest are inexorably beating down the worn-out theories
which hitherto .have sustained the whole policy of testimonial privilege.
The manifest destiny of the laws of evidence -is a lowering of the barriers
which have held back the truth.44 Perhaps the physician-patient privilege
is on the way out. It is ironical indeed that much of the pressure operat-
ing against the privilege is being exerted by the very legislatures which
enacted it. They have all but cancelled out the intended benefits of the
statute. Most of the medical confidences they once saw fit to preserve
inviolate are now required by them to be reported by physicians, and
sometimes 'by hospitals, to the public health authorities and, on some
occasions, to particular persons who are likely to come in contact with
their patients; moreover, some of these reports are made a matter of
public record. It should be noted also that not only is the physician re-
quired to report such information but, in many cases, he can be com-
pelled to testify and relate the facts and his conclusions thereon.4 5 In
most of the states, physicians are now required by law to prepare and
file for public record certificates of death which state the causes of death
and whether they are accidental, homicidal, or suicidal. In some states
the legislatures have enacted laws which require drunken operators of
automobiles to submit to blood, saliva, and urine tests; and some compel
prostitutes to submit to physical examinations for venereal disease. In
a number of states, the legislatures have authorized the courts to appoint
physicians to examine and to testify on the mental condition of persons
suspected of feeblemindedness or insanity, or of being sexual psychopaths;
and there are many more such laws.
As a result of the astounding change in the attitude of the legisla-
tures, there are today few medical confidences that can really be kept
secret except, of course, in a court of law where justice cries out for the
facts. But why, we ask, should they be protected there? Honest patients
have little to fear for they will not hide the truth, whether the privilege
exists or not. Except in rare cases, only the dishonest litigant will attempt to
shut out truth. It is high time to abolish the physician-patient privilege.
44. McCormick, The Scope of Privilege in the Law of Evidence, 16 TExAs L REV.
447, 469 (1938). Judge Jerome Frank has recommended abolition of most of the
exclusionary rules of evidence except those relating to self-incrimination and to evi-
dence obtained by unlawful search and seizure. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 422
(1949). See also De Parcq, The Uniform Rules of Evidence, 40 MINN. L. REv.
301, 322-327 (1956).
45. DeWitt, Medical Ethics and the Law: The Conflict Between Dual Allegiances,
5 WEST. REs. L. REv. 5, 8 (1953).
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